Learning Realistic Patterns from Unrealistic Stimuli: Generalization and
  Data Anonymization by Nikolaidis, Konstantinos et al.
Learning Realistic Patterns from Unrealistic
Stimuli: Generalization and Data Anonymization
Konstantinos Nikolaidis ∗1, Stein Kristiansen1, Thomas Plagemann1, Vera Goebel1,
Knut Liestl1, Mohan Kankanhalli2, Gunn Marit Traaen3,4,5, Britt verland6, Harriet
Akre4,10, Lars Aakery7,8, and Sigurd Steinshamn7,8
1
Department of Informatics, University of Oslo, Norway
2Department of Computer Science, National University of Singapore, Singapore
3Department of Cardiology, Oslo University Hospital, Rikshospitalet, Oslo, Norway
4Institute of Clinical Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
5KG Jebsen Center for Cardiac Research, University of Oslo, Norway and Center for Heart Failure
Research, Oslo University Hospital, Norway
6Department of Otorhinolaryngology, Head & Neck Surgery, Sleep Unit, Lovisenberg Diakonale
Hospital, Oslo, Norway
7Department of Thoracic Medicine, St. Olavs University Hospital, Trondheim, Norway
8KG Jebsen Center of Exercise in Medicine, Department of Circulation and Medical Imaging,
Faculty of Medicine and Health Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology,
Trondheim, Norway.
9Department of Cardiology and Center for Cardiological Innovation, Oslo University Hospital,
Rikshospitalet, Oslo, Norway
10Department of Otorhinolaryngology, Head & Neck Surgery, Oslo University Hospital,
Rikshospitalet, Oslo, Norway
Abstract
Good training data is a prerequisite to develop useful ML applica-
tions. However, in many domains existing data sets cannot be shared due
to privacy regulations (e.g., from medical studies). This work investigates
a simple yet unconventional approach for anonymized data synthesis to
enable third parties to benefit from such private data. We explore the fea-
sibility of learning implicitly from unrealistic, task-relevant stimuli, which
are synthesized by exciting the neurons of a trained deep neural network
(DNN). As such, neuronal excitation serves as a pseudo-generative model.
The stimuli data is used to train new classification models. Furthermore,
we extend this framework to inhibit representations that are associated
with specific individuals. We use sleep monitoring data from both an
open and a large closed clinical study and evaluate whether (1) end-users
can create and successfully use customized classification models for sleep
apnea detection, and (2) the identity of participants in the study is pro-
tected. Extensive comparative empirical investigation shows that different
algorithms trained on the stimuli are able generalize successfully on the
same task as the original model. However, architectural and algorithmic
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similarity between new and original models play an important role in per-
formance. For similar architectures, the performance is close to that of
using the true data (e.g., Accuracy difference of 0.56%, Kappa coefficient
difference of 0.03-0.04). Further experiments show that the stimuli can to
a large extent successfully anonymize participants of the clinical studies.
1 Introduction
In recent years, machine learning (ML) has become a viable solution for various
applications due to rapid developments in sensor technologies, data acquisition
tools, and ML algorithms (e.g., deep learning). It is well-known that training
data of sufficient quality and quantity is a pre-requisite to train a ML classifica-
tion model (classifier), that can generalize reliably. However, there are situations
in which access to data that fulfil these requirements is restricted, e.g., due to
privacy concerns.
Such situations are particularly prominent in the medical domain. One ex-
ample is the Cesar project [1], which aims to enable individuals to perform sleep
monitoring at home with low-cost sensors and ML-based automatic sleep apnea
detection on their smart-phone. Having access to labelled sensor data from a
large clinical study enables us in the project to train ML classification models
and evaluate their performance. The final goal of the project is to allow any in-
dividual to use a customized classifier that is tailored to the particular needs of
the individual. However, regulatory restrictions prohibit us to share the data,
neither with individuals so that they can create their own customized classi-
fiers, nor for other scientific purposes. Creating for any interested individual a
customized classifier in our lab is no feasible solution.
A possible solution to this problem is to release an anonymized version of the
data with the use of existing database anonymization strategies like k-anonymity
[2] or l-diversity [3]. However, since crucial parts of our data are raw sensory
time-series data from which identification can be done indirectly via learning, ex-
isting database anonymization strategies are not suitable for this task. Another
option would be to only release white-box or black-box classifiers in the form of
an API or mechanisms that perform classification or extract important statis-
tics from the data. For this purpose, differential privacy [4] is a well-established
framework that offers theoretical guarantees for privacy preserving application
of statistical mechanisms. Works such as [5] make differential privacy a viable
option for ML applications. However, this option defeats our goal of giving cus-
tomization freedom to the end-users. Additionally, though theoretically sound,
differential privacy has been shown to yield in many cases unacceptable privacy-
performance trade-offs [6], and to be susceptible to different information leakage
attacks [7, 8]. A third option is to train a differentially private generative model
like [9] or [10] on our data, in order to synthesize a dataset that we could release
to the public. We avoid this option for two reasons: (1) because of the points
discussed above about differential privacy; (2) as we care about the identifica-
tion of recordings and not of individual datapoints, we would need to apply the
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group privacy property while training such a model. However, this would either
weaken the attainable privacy guarantee or the performance.
Based on the above discussion, we explore in this work a different option,
which is not sufficiently studied in related works. We investigate the empirical
feasibility of labelled noisy higher-layer representations for training other ”stu-
dent” classifiers to generalize reliably on the real data. The goal is to create
a labelled dataset from which a model can be taught to perform sleep apnea
classification, while at the same time data from this dataset cannot be strongly
identified as belonging to a specific recording. To do this, we exploit the knowl-
edge obtained by a given trained classifier, which we refer to as Teacher, hT for
notational convenience. hT is trained to capture the most important aspects
of the real data based on the loss it attempts to minimize, making it learn
task-related knowledge about the training data. We expect that excitatory or
inhibitory datapoints (which we call stimuli) of specific neurons can also contain
important information about the class decisions of hT . Based on this, we learn
to generate varying stimuli targeting the output of one or more hT and use these
stimuli to train a student classifier hS . Neuronal Excitation (NE), is a general
method that can be applied on artificial neural networks [11] as well as on the
mammalian inferotemporal cortex [12]. We use in this work Activation Maxi-
mization (or Minimization) (AM) [13] as NE. AM is a well-established method
for interpretation of neuronal activity. The overall proposed procedure is loosely
related to implicit learning [14] in the sense that for hS , knowledge about fea-
tures of the true joint distribution is acquired implicitly, and not through direct
loss minimization on data sampled from it (or from a distribution that approx-
imates it).
This leads us to an important novel aspect of this work that to the best of
our knowledge serves as a differentiating factor compared to other generative
approaches. The stimuli we are synthesizing need not necessarily be realistic.
On the contrary, to some extent we want them to be unrealistic. We want hS to
learn indirectly through the stimuli and generalize on the real data. Please note
that such an approach, only captures those features needed to strongly excite or
inhibit different class neurons of hT . This is in contrast to a generative model
or framework which would attempt to capture all features necessary to learn
the joint or the data (marginal) distribution based on its loss. Therefore, we
have more direct access to the conditional distribution we want to learn. We
hypothesize that this procedure is a natural way to generate datapoints that,
though unrealistic, could contain inherently important information about the
class separation we care about, e.g., sleep apnea in our case. Additionally, the
datapoints could potentially provide less ”unwanted” information for other class
separations which we want not to be learned. In this work our contributions are
as follows:
• We demonstrate that the proposed approach is an empirically feasible way
to learn and generalize successfully on new data from the true distribution.
• We investigate the applicability of training different smaller architectures
for successful customization with the use of the generated stimuli dataset.
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We compare with an existing well-established generative approach, namely
gradient-penalty Wasserstein GAN [15], and illustrate promising results.
• We empirically show the viability of a variation of the proposed approach
as a means of generating anonymized data. To do this we develop a pa-
tient de-anonymization attack inspired from face identification, and eval-
uate how the AM stimuli compare to the real data in terms of the iden-
tification success of the adversary. Furthermore, we explore the defence
capability that the proposed approach offers against membership infer-
ence attacks and exhibit additional potentially useful properties of the
described method.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the proposed
approach. Section 3 describes the application scenario and the datasets we use.
In Section 4 we perform experiments to investigate the generalization and cus-
tomization capabilities of the proposed approach. In Section 5 we investigate
defensive and anonymization properties and in Section 6 we discuss additional
characteristics of the proposed approach. Section 7 compares with related lit-
erature. Section 8 concludes this paper.
2 Approach
In this section we discuss the approach we use to generate a synthetic labelled
dataset consisting of noisy stimuli via the use of AM.
Figure 1: Four main steps of the proposed approach. TEACHER corresponds
to hT and STUDENT to hS
2.1 Generating Synthetic Data with AM
We want to transfer the knowledge of a given trained DNN classifier hT to
another model or learning algorithm hS through the use of a synthetic dataset
4
DS , with hS , hT : X → Y , where X is the input and Y the output space. We
assume that the original data D 1, with which hT is trained is not available
for training of hS . The end-user who trains hS has only access to DS . We
aim to enable hS to classify data that come from the same distribution as D
with a similar performance as hT . One way to do this efficiently is to extract
the knowledge accumulated by hT with the creation of DS . The novelty of the
proposed approach stems from the fact that we utilize AM in an unconventional
manner with the goal of creating a diverse, multi-faceted dataset that can be
used to train another classifier.
Depending on the success of the generation procedure to map the important
features learned by hT into DS , and the algorithmic and architectural similarity
between hT and hS , we show that it is possible for hS to learn to perform the
classification task hT has learned.
Design: Our proposed design is based on four basic steps (see Figure 1):
• Step 1 - Training of the teacher. We train hT in a supervised manner
with D to learn the underlying conditional data distribution p(y|x). This
requires the original labelled training data.
• Step 2 - Creating the synthetic dataset. We create a synthetic dataset
DS that captures features that hT has learned from training on D. A
generation procedure Gen{hT } is used to create this synthetic dataset.
As Gen{hT }, we perform AM via a deep generator network (GAM ) that
transforms a small noise vector zin to examples that strongly activate a
predefined neuron. Inspirations for this design are [16, 17]. After the
synthetic set is created, we create its labels. If xs is a synthetic example
created by Gen{hT }, we give xs the label that hT chooses for it, i.e., either
the class with the maximum output probability, arg maxi{h(i)T (θ, xs)} (i
corresponds to the possible class of the output and θ corresponds to the
parameter vector of hT ), or the softmax of the output to capture the
output probabilities of hT .
• Step 3 - Training of the student. As next step hS is trained by using
the synthetic data and labels produced by Step 2. hS can be a larger or
smaller DNN than hT , or even be based on a different learning method,
e.g, an SVM.
• Step 4 - Use the student on the test set.
The choice of Gen{hT } and which method to use for hS are two central
decisions. Next, we discuss the choice of Gen{hT }.
Generation: For the stimuli generation we consider two approaches: AM and
code inversion [18], since both approaches result in expressive data based on the
1In this work we use the terms real data and original data interchangeably to describe D.
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acquired knowledge of hT . Code inversion requires the original training data, or
the logits of the data from the fully connected layer we try to match. However,
training hS without access to D would be beneficial towards our anonymization
objectives. Therefore, we use AM for the generation of the synthetic dataset.
We further discuss this choice from a more theoretical viewpoint in the next
section. Note that contrary to other works like [17], the goal of Gen{hT } is
not to produce realistic looking synthetic data, but instead to create a synthetic
dataset that can reliably train hS .
Formally, we assume a trained model hT (θ, x) with x being an element of the
input space X, and θ the parameter vector of the model, which is an element of
parameter space Θ. To synthesize data that the trained model hT (θ, x) perceives
as elements of a class, Gen{hT } uses AM on the activations of the output layer
of hT (θ, x) via GAM such that:
θ∗G = arg max
θGs.t||GAM (θG,zin)||∞≤RG
{h(i)TL(θ,GAM (θG, zin))} (1)
where i corresponds to the class we want to find a stimulus for, and θG is
the parameter vector of GAM
2. Note that θ is static because hT is already
trained and we are optimizing for θG given varying ”pseudo inputs” of zin. RG
is the maximum allowed value of the norm of the output of GAM
3. We use
the l∞-norm, i.e., a hyper-cube to express the bounding, and L denotes the
output layer. We choose to perform AM in the output layer of hT since we
want stimuli that correspond to a strong belief for a class in hT . We use zin as
an input random noise vector (mainly from uniform distribution) which GAM
transforms into the stimulus. We intentionally do not give any additional priors
to Gen{hT }, since we do not want to constrain our exploration of the feature
space.
We stop the AM when the output of the target class neuron i is higher than
all the other output neurons and exceeds a threshold TH:
h
(i)
TL
(θ,GAM (zin, θ
∗
G)) > TH (2)
This implies that θ∗G that satisfies Eq. 2 exists in a subspace defined by the
decision boundaries of class i. We assume that softmax activation is used on
the output layer.
We specify the loss of GAM to maximize the logits of each class of hT
(TEACHER in Figure 1). Then, to make the generated synthetic stimuli more
diverse, we add inherent randomness in the AM procedure. We do this by
reinitializing the AM generator, by randomly setting TH to one of several pos-
sible values, and by editing randomly generated datapoints instead of gener-
ating them (for more details please refer to Appendix D). Our goal is to cap-
ture a wide variety of different starting positions for the gradient ascent (AM).
2Notation and naming conventions are summarized in C.4.
3We use sigmoids or tanh on the output of GAM . This makes the l∞-norm a natural way
to bound the output. For more information on the design of GAM please refer to Appendix
B.
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This means that assuming that the starting position xsin of a stimulus before
the AM optimization takes place is drawn from distribution pAMin , we want
supp(pAMin) = X, so that xsin ∈ X. Furthermore, we want to randomize
where the gradient ascent will end up, given that the threshold condition is
satisfied.
We perform the AM from each initial position towards a random class with
equal probability, to create a stimulus. The result is a synthetic dataset com-
prised of the stimuli of hT for all the classes. The goal of the different initial
feature space positions is to take advantage of the multi-faceted property of
the neuronal activation [19] when performing AM to create a diverse synthetic
dataset. In the next section, we analyze our choice of AM as a means to confine
the feature space, in order to ”focus” hS ’s learning to important regions of the
feature space.
2.2 Why AM?
Assuming a marginal distribution pN , with a support supp(pN ) = X from
which we draw data that we label with hT and then use them to train hS . It is
straightforward to show that for hT and hS , with the same architecture which
corresponds to the same hypothesis space, i.e., HS = HT , hS has theoretically
the ability to learn to perfectly imitate hT . Even when hS uses a thinner variant
of the network architecture of hT , it is possible to show that if certain conditions
are met, we can probabilistically expect better learning behavior as we increase
the hypothesis HS towards that of HT . We defer a more detailed discussion on
this topic to Appendix C.
However, despite of the above point, as the dimensionality of the input
space increases, training hS with generated data from a different marginal data
distribution than the real data becomes unviable. To mitigate this effect, we
confine the space in which we perform the minimization. There could be many
ways to confine the space in which we wish to have low true risk. Since we
have in our case no access to the true marginal distribution p(x), we confine
the space to sub-regions of high confidence for our conditional estimator. Thus,
one of the core ideas of this work is that, assuming that our hT is good at
approximating p(y|x), regions that the classes are inconclusive for hT should also
be inconclusive for p(y|x). Thus, by definition there cannot be a strong belief
for any algorithm that estimates p(y|x) well in these sub-regions. In the next
section, we explain how we use this principle to inhibit the class probabilities
of a recording’s conditional approximator, i.e., a model that recognizes different
recordings, for the purpose of anonymization.
2.3 Recording Anonymization with Inhibitory Stimuli
To satisfy our objective of generating anonymized data in relation to information
about class separation for a different labelling for patient classification that we
wish to hide, we need to extend our approach. Our design is loosely inspired by
the analysis of [20]. We assume a new learning task X → U , different from the
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original X → Y . U in our case is the set of all the identities of the patients we
have in our dataset, which corresponds, based on some ordering of the identities,
to {0, .., Np} ∈ N where Np is the number of patients.
Figure 2: Synthesizing stimuli that excitate the p(y|x) approximator hT , de-
picted as TEACHERY ,while inhibiting the p(u|x) approximator, depicted as
TEACHERU
To model this labelling, we use a random variable u ∈ U , conditionally
dependent on x by p(u|x). Our goal is to generate data that are not strongly
affiliated with any outcome of u. Formally, we want: ∀xS ∈ DS ,∀uc ∈ U :
p(uc|xs) ≈ p(uc). We hypothesize that if y and u are not strongly correlated
given different outcomes of x then learning for X → Y would be possible with
data that satisfy the previous requirement.
In practice, to achieve this, we train a network hTU to approximate p(u|x).
Then we alternate between training updates for the original objective and the
following cross-entropy loss:
LU (θG) = −
∑
uc
pˆ(uc) log hTU (GAM (θG, zin))
The optimization is done for θG, after training hT and hTU . The weights of
hT and hTU are frozen. pˆ(u) is the empirical approximation of the marginal
distribution of u. The optimization stops when both the threshold condition of
Eq. 2, and a proximity condition regarding pˆ(u) are satisfied (e.g., LU (θG) <
THU , for some threshold THU ).
3 Application Scenario and Datasets
The previous section presents a new approach to use modified noise, transformed
to stimuli instead of the real data as a means of teaching new classifiers about
the class separation for a task we are interested in. Furthermore, this approach
can provide protection against potential adversarial information leakage attacks.
These two advantages of the algorithm are individually evaluated in Section 4
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and 5. Both evaluations are performed for the application scenario of sleep apnea
detection and we use for both the same datasets. Therefore, we describe in this
section the application scenario and the datasets, before we (1) investigate in
Section 4 how well different ML methods or architectures can generalize when
trained with stimuli generated from the knowledge of hT and (2) investigate in
Section 5 whether using stimuli instead of real data can provide protection for
certain adversarial attacks.
In the Cesar project we want to detect Obstructive Sleep Apnea (OSA) with
low-cost sensors and using ML-based analysis on smart-phones. Sleep Apnea
events are defined as the cessation of airflow for at least 10 seconds or reduced
airflow by at least 30% (American Academy of Sleep Medicine - AASM, [21]).
OSA can be detected by Polysomnography(PSG) in sleep laboratory or by
polygraphy at home. A variety of physiological signals are commonly used for
OSA detection, including the electrocardiogram (ECG), electroencephalogram
(EEG), electromyogram (EMG), electrooculograph (EOG), oxygen saturation,
heart rate, blood pressure and respiration from the abdomen, chest and nose.
OSA is a very common, yet severely under-diagnosed disorder. In Norway,
it is estimated that around 25% of all middle-aged Norwegians are at high risk
of having obstructive sleep apnea, yet approximately 7080% of all cases are
expected to be undiagnosed [22]. In our work, we use data from a large clinical
study, called A3 study, at the Oslo University Hospital and St. Olavs University
Hospital. In this study, sleep monitoring data from several hundred patients is
collected and analyzed. As such, this is data that is collected every day in
clinical settings to address a severe health issue. However, privacy regulations
do not permit to share the data and prevent reproducibility of the results in
this paper gained with the A3 data. Therefore, we use in addition to the A3
data the well-known open sleep monitoring data set called Apnea-ECG [23].
Sleep monitoring data are for most humans hard to evaluate and can contain
noise and artifacts. Thus, we start our investigation with a simpler problem and
a well understood dataset, namely digit recognition with the MNIST dataset.
The insights gained with MNIST help to properly experiment and interpret
results with the more challenging sleep monitoring datasets. Furthermore, the
use of two different types of data indicates the generalizability of the proposed
approach.
We use three datasets to evaluate our approach:
• MNIST is a well-known database containing a training set of 60000 28×28
black and white images of 0-9 handwritten digits and a test set of 10000
digits. Out of the 60000 training data we use 5000 as validation set.
• Apnea-ECG is a well-known open database from Physionet which con-
tains data from multiple sensors capturing ECG, respiration from the chest
and abdomen, nasal airflow (NAF), and oxygen saturation. The data con-
tain sleep recordings from 8 patients with durations of 7- 10 hours. Apnea-
ECG has been collected in a sleep laboratory with PSG and preprocessed
such that it contains only high quality data. From Apnea-ECG we mainly
use the NAF signal, because it can be used adequately to train a classifier
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to recognize apneas and yields the best single signal performance among
all the respiratory signals as shown in our previous work [24] . We use
the eight sleep recordings that contain the NAF signal (i.e., a01, a02, a03,
a04, c01, c02, c03, b01). The sampling frequency of the sensors is 100
Hz and all recordings contain labels for every minute window of breathing
that signifies whether the minute is apneic or not, i.e., whether the person
is experiencing an apneic event during this minute or not.
• The A3 study [25] investigates the prevalence, characteristics, risk factors
and type of sleep apnea in patients with paroxysmal atrial fibrillation. The
data were obtained with the use of the Nox T3 sleep monitor [26] with
mobile sleep monitoring at home, which in turn results into lower data
quality than data from PSG in sleep-laboratories. An experienced sleep
specialist scored the recordings manually using Noxturnal software such
that the beginning and end of all types of apnea events is marked in the
time-series data. To use the data for the experiments in this paper, we
labeled every 60 second window of the data as apneic (if an apneic event
happened during this time window) or as non-apneic. The data we use
in the experiments is from 438 patients and comprises 241350 minutes
of sleep monitoring data. The ratio of apneic to non-apneic windows is
0.238. We use the NAF signal from the A3 data in the experiments, i.e.,
the same signal we use from Apnea-ECG .
4 Generalization and Customization
In this section we investigate how well can models trained on DS generalize,
and how feasible it is for different architectures or methods to learn from DS .
4.1 Experimental Set-up
We evaluate the generalization capability of the proposed approach when hS is
either similar or dissimilar to hT , and we compare with other methods. For this
comparison we select the gradient-penalty Wasserstein GAN [15, 27], which we
will refer to as WGAN for brevity. We made this selection since this framework
is very well-established (in terms of citations and github repository projects),
and it is a more modern, general approach of the successful GAN framework.
Additionally, the WGAN is especially stable during training and exceptionally
good at avoiding mode-collapse. Furthermore, it is able to produce very realistic
and stable results for our tasks. In this section we evaluate the proposed design
from Section 2.1 with all three datasets described in Section 3.
We preprocess the data for each experiment. For MNIST, we rescale the
data from 0-255 to 0-1. We downsample Apnea-ECG and A3 to 1Hz. We
additionally rebalance the A3 dataset by subsampling randomly the majority
class. As a result, the rebalanced dataset includes an equal amount of apneic
and non-apneic labels. In all experiments we perform four steps: (1) train hT ,
(2) use AM or WGAN to generate a synthetic dataset (3) train hS with the
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(a) Apnea-ECG, Real Data
(b) MNIST, Real Data
(c) Apnea-ECG, Stimuli
(d) MNIST, Stimuli
Figure 3: Real data ((a) and (b)) and stimuli ((c) and (d)) for Apnea-ECG ((a)
and (c)) and MNIST ((b) and (d)) datasets. In both cases the AM stimuli are
as expected not realistic. However, it is possible for a student classifier to learn
from the stimuli and successfully generalize to the real data. Additionally, the
labels of the datapoints are shown above the images of the data. The sleep
apnea data shown correspond to the NAF signal of the patients (recorded by
nasal thermistor). The y-axis corresponds to mV and x-axis to seconds (windows
of 60 seconds). In all cases, the minimum required threshold used to generate
AM-stimuli was TH > 0.96.
synthetic data, and (4) evaluate hS with the test set. For MNIST we use the
original test set. For Apnea-ECG and A3, we create a test set by randomly
sampling from the datasets. We use 15% of the Apnea-ECG data and 20% of
the A3 data as test set. For the WGAN model, we use a conditional WGAN
based on [28].
Different configurations for the AM- and WGAN-based set-ups can yield
very different results. Therefore, we perform in a pre-study Steps (2) to (4) with
different hyperparameter configurations. We then choose the configuration that
yields the best average performance of hS across three iterations.
With the configuration chosen from the pre-study we repeat Steps (2)-(4)
to perform the actual test. With the selected configurations, we create the
synthetic dataset in Step (2). With this dataset we evaluate the performance of
hS on the test set by training and testing hS for five iterations of Steps (3,4).
We use a validation set and save periodically the parameters of hS . We choose
the parameters which yield the best validation performance and use this model
to classify the test set.
For the WGAN comparison, we assume that the host releases synthetic data,
which are synthesized from a WGAN generator, in order to train hS . For this
comparison to be on equal terms, we design the WGAN such that the WGAN
generator has a similar architectural configuration as hT . Furthermore, we train
hS with the original training data and evaluate it on the test set in order to
understand the impact of similarity (in terms of architecture and size) onto the
performance of hS .
We investigate five different hS architectures, called ID, S, VS, L, and LL.
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ID is identical to hT
4. S is similar to hT , but with half the number of weights
per layer. VS has a quarter of the weights per layer compared to hT
5. The
architecture of L is similar to hT , but without the second to last fully connected
layer. In LL, the second and third to last layers (either fully connected or convo-
lutional) are removed. For all experiments, we aim for the WGAN generator to
have a similar number of parameters and architecture to hT . For the AM case
we use as labels the softmax outputs of the output neurons (soft labels). For
all datasets we investigated, we did not achieve significant performance gains
by utilizing larger architectures than the ones we chose as hT . Furthermore,
we focus our evaluation on smaller classifiers potentially for use in a resource
constrained environment. All architectures for all experiments of this section
are presented in Appendix B.
4.2 Stimuli
Figure 3 shows examples of AM stimuli from MNIST and Apnea-ECG. Al-
though the stimuli are as expected not realistic, they implicitly contain useful
information about their respective classes. As such, a classifier that learns from
the stimuli is able to a certain extent to generalize on the real data, depend-
ing on the algorithm used (see Section 4.6). In both cases, the stimuli can be
drastically different, even when they represent the same class. This diversity is
beneficial for the student’s learning. Additionally, it is hard in both cases to
distinguish between the classes for the stimuli.
To verify that the synthetic data did not contain true datapoints from the
original training data, we found the closest distance datapoints between the
AM produced dataset and the true dataset for all the datasets we experimented
with (MNIST, ApneaECG, A3). In Appendix E we present the closest neighbors
for all datasets we used. In all cases, no datapoint from the training set was
recreated in the synthetic data.
4.3 Digit Classification
We follow the aforementioned set-up and investigate the performance of hS . As
hT we use a convolutional neural network loosely based on LeNet-5 [29], but
with one convolutional layer less and more weights per layer. Based on this,
hT comprises of two convolutional, one max-pool and two relu fully connected
layers (conv2D, maxpool, conv2D, fc1, fc2, dropout on fc1). We choose this
architecture since it is a well-established model for digit classification. Further-
more, we use more weights per layer to have a larger initial model as hT , since it
also achieves better on average performance than the thinner variants we exper-
imented with. Similarly, the WGAN generator is a deconvolutional generator
network with two fully connected and two deconvolutional layers with a few
more parameters per layer than hT . ID has the same architecture as hT . S,
4 The network hT corresponds to the TEACHER of Figure 1.
5With the exception of MNIST, where we experiment with an even smaller design. For
more details please refer to Appendix B.
12
(a) Training Loss (b) Validation Loss
Figure 4: Train (a) and Validation (b) loss for the real dataset (blue), WGAN
(orange) and AM generation (Green) with MNIST. In both Figures we show
the graphs from batch 150 for better scaling.
VS,L, and LL are structured as defined above. The third to last layer of LL is a
convolutional layer. For more details on the different architectures, weights per
layer, filter sizes, including the AM generator, please refer to Appendix B. hT is
trained with a batch size of 128 for 3125 batch iterations (see Section 6). In this
experiment we generate 60000 AM stimuli and WGAN data. The experiment
is repeated five times.
hT Accuracy for MNIST: 99.08
Structure MaxLayer Baseline WGAN AM
ID: cmcmdd c:32 - d:1372 99.20±0.02 97.63±0.08 98.64±0.24
S: cmcmdd c:16 - d:588 99.11±0.02 97.56±0.03 98.19±0.06
VS: cmcmdd c:16 - d:64 98.73±0.13 97.24±0.06 97.45±0.11
L: cmcmd c:32 - d:1372 98.89±0.04 97.50±0.05 98.04±0.05
LL: cmmd c:32 - d:1568 98.68±0.04 97.05±0.06 94.86±0.12
Table 1: Accuracy of the hS for MNIST experiment, and structures of the hS .
c: convolutional layer, m: maxpooling, d: fully connected. The Max. Layer
column depicts the maximum number of channels and neurons in a single layer
used for convolutional layers and fully connected layers respectively.
Table 1 summarizes the results from the MNIST experiment. AM outper-
forms the similar WGAN generator for all hS architectures, except LL. The
differences between the AM and WGAN results are statistically significant for
the one paired t-test (p = 5%) for all hS architectures, except VS. This could
potentially be attributed to a better estimation of the class boundaries of the
test set from the AM stimuli than from the WGAN data. Additionally, we
hypothesize that hT contains more information about the classification than
the WGAN generator, since its loss is directly determined by the classification
goal, which is not the case for the WGAN generator. Thus, if this knowledge is
sufficiently mapped on a dataset, it could represent better the class separation
boundaries than a dataset from the WGAN generator which potentially only
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focuses on realistic class data.
However, notice the much lower performance of hS with the LL architecture
for the AM generation compared to the WGAN. Generally, as the architecture
of hS becomes smaller the drop in performance is steeper for AM than for the
WGAN. This is a recurring phenomenon through all our experiments and we
discuss it in detail in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. The Baseline performance exceeds
that of both methods in all cases, as expected.
Training and validation loss: We calculate the training and validation loss
throughout the training of the ID model for the different datasets. We present
the results in Figure 4. The training loss of the AM dataset (green) is stable and
larger than the training loss for the Real (Blue) and WGAN (Orange) datasets.
However, we notice for the AM case a much better and more stable behavior
for the Validation set. We expect that these effects can be attributed in part
to the use of soft labels. We discuss these effects in more detail in Section 4.5.
Also, the validation loss of the WGAN increases faster than for the real dataset.
This could be attributed to the lesser variety of the WGAN data in relation to
the real data.
4.4 Apnea Detection
For the apnea detection experiments, we repeat the same procedure as in the
previous experiment. For Apnea-ECG (AE), we use MLP instead of a CNN to
investigate how the procedure changes with a different architecture as hT . For
the A3 dataset, we use a 1D convolutional neural network (see details in Table 2
and Appendix B). All activations are relu, and dropout is used in both datasets
for the second to last fully connected layer. The generators of the WGAN for
the two datasets correspond to similar sizes and architectures to hT . Similar
architectural conventions apply to the different hS we experimented with, based
on the definition in Section 4.1.
It is important to mention that for apnea detection we use the kappa co-
efficient [30] as performance metric. We make this choice because the kappa
coefficient better captures performance characteristics in a single metric than
accuracy, as it takes into account the possibility of agreement by chance between
the two annotators (real labels and predictions). We present the accuracy, speci-
ficity, and sensitivity results in Appendix A. We use for both datasets batch size
of 128 to train hT . With AE, we train for 3000 batch iterations and with A3
for 15000 iterations. In both datasets (AE and A3) we generate 20000 stimuli.
Table 2 summarizes the results for the apnea detection experiments. We
observe that for all cases, AM outperforms the WGAN for both datasets. Con-
trary to all other cases, for VS the results are not significantly larger for AM for
the A3 dataset when compared to WGAN. For the one tailed t-test, the p-value
is: 0.34 > 0.05. The performance drop of hS from ID to VS and to LL is much
smaller for the WGAN case than for the AM case. In fact, for Apnea-ECG
the performance of the VS hS for the WGAN dataset is better than the perfor-
mance of the ID or S hS . Also notice the large performance difference between
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hT kappa(×100) for Apnea-ECG (AE): 86.90, A3: 66.71
Structure MaxLayer Baseline WGAN AM
AE ID: dddd d:360 86.90±0.20 72.14±0.94 83.90±0.37
AE S: dddd d:180 87.39±0.50 69.28±0.91 82.51±0.61
AE VS: dddd d:90 85.67±0.27 72.43±1.05 81.63±0.41
AE L: ddd d:360 84.49±0.25 71.44±0.68 81.6±0.71
AE LL: dd d:360 85.62±0.27 70.99±0.31 80.90±0.31
A3 ID: cmcmcmdd c:64 -d:512 67.06±0.19 60.39±0.31 62.98±0.70
A3 S: cmcmcmdd c:32-d:256 67.29±0.20 59.66±0.58 62.95±0.60
A3 VS: cmcmcmdd c:16-d:128 66.06±0.09 58.95±0.64 59.99±1.15
A3 L: cmcmcmd c:64-d:512 67.24±0.16 60.14±0.37 63.88±0.23
A3 LL: cmcmmd c:32-d:256 66.66±0.13 58.96±0.6 62.13±0.29
Table 2: Kappa of the hS for AE and A3 experiments for different hS sizes when
training with data generated from our method and from a conditional WGAN
of similar size. The MaxLayer column depicts the maximum number of neurons
and channels of the net used.
the models trained on WGAN data and AM data for the Apnea-ECG dataset.
We attribute this difference in performance to the failure of the MLP WGAN
generator to capture the important features of the dataset. Additionally, the
Baseline outperforms WGAN and AM for all cases. The Baseline performance
is similar across the hS for both datasets. This means that when trained with
the real data the performance of sleep apnea detection seems less sensitive to
changes to the size of the network and the architecture than digit classification.
This could be due to the less distinct class boundaries in the case of sleep apnea
detection relative to digit classification.
4.5 Additional Insights
In most cases we investigated, the performance of hS is superior when training
with AM stimuli than when training with WGAN generated data. However,
as mentioned above, as we reduce the size of hS , the drop in performance is
steeper for the AM stimuli case than for the WGAN data case. One potential
explanation of this phenomenon relates to an architectural mismatch between
hS and hT (see Section 4.6). Another explanation relates to the type of labelling.
We hypothesize that the effect occurs due to complex classification bounds of
AM generated stimuli. These complex bounds are potentially a result of the
soft labelling. This hypothesis is generally strengthened by the fact that the
training loss during the training for the MNIST ID experiment is unstable and
never goes to 0. This means that even the largest network does not over-train to
the AM data (see Figure 4). However, if we use hard labels, information of the
beliefs of hT is being lost, and we get a steep performance drop among all hS .
As a result, soft labels are preferable. This relates to an additional property.
From Figure 4 we see that the validation loss for the AM data is exceptionally
15
stable in relation to the real and WGAN data. This means that at least for this
experiment, the generalization capability of the classifier trained on the AM
data was not compromised by over-training. This indicates that AM generation
with soft labels introduces a form of regularization during the training of hS .
4.6 Generalization with Different Classifiers as hS
An interesting point of the above results is the consistently high performance
of hS with similar architectures to that of hT . This raises the question whether
it is possible to achieve a correspondingly high performance when using alter-
native architectures or classification methods as hS . We examined how a large
dense deep net with relu activations, a RBF kernel SVM and a Random Forest
ensemble with 50 trees perform when trained with AM stimuli on the MNIST
dataset. The AM performance in all cases is low. For the SVM we have: Real
Data: 94.42, AM Stimuli: 39.96. For the DNN: Real Data: 98.3, AM Stimuli:
81.06. For the RF: Real Data: 96.81, AM Stimuli: 30.82. This drop in relation
to the real performance could happen since the AM stimuli are less correlated
to the real test data than the real training data is. Especially for the SVM and
the RF, for which the drop is much steeper than with the DNN, the difference
in train and test marginal distributions can have a detrimental effect on their
performance. This could happen since these models are not able to learn higher
layer representations from the data, but instead they classify based on low-level
decisions derived directly from support vectors or comparisons of feature values.
Another explanation relates to the use of the same architectures for hT and hS
in our experiments. For example, it is known that the convolutional architecture
imposes inductive biases over the learning algorithm [31]. Thus, we suppose
that when hS has the same type of bias (i.e., the same architecture) as hT , it
can better capture and interpret how the stimuli correlate to the real data than
another algorithm without this prior bias.
5 Defenses and Additional Properties
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the protection against specific in-
formation leakage attacks that DS or models trained on DS acquire, compared
to when using the real data. Furthermore, we investigate additional potentially
useful properties of DS .
5.1 Recording Association through Generalization
We investigate an attack against anonymized open recordings. This attack is
performed by recognizing, through generalization, associations among record-
ings that belong to the same individual. We perform a simple, preliminary
demonstration of the feasibility of the proposed attack, and show how the AM
generated data can offer significantly better protection against identification in
comparison to the real data.
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5.1.1 Threat Model
The proposed attack draws inspiration from similar face identification tasks. We
assume that an adversary has access (potentially via a security breach) to sleep
recordings from a group of individuals together with personal information about
them like, e.g., their names. Furthermore we assume an open dataset which
contains anonymized recordings (like Apnea-ECG), and that all recording data
consist of sensory signals. The goal of the attack is to probabilistically determine
whether an individual has contributed a sleep recording to the open anonymized
dataset. To do this, one can train a classifier to distinguish between data of
different individuals that belong to the breach, and generalize to data from the
open dataset. If the data sufficiently captures the idiosyncrasies of the different
individuals, we expect good classification performance on new data from the
same person. We ideally expect the following behavior: (1) for recordings of
the open dataset that belong to individuals of the breach, we expect many
minutes in the correct class i.e., classified correctly by the classifier as belonging
to the correct individual; (2) for recordings of the breach that do not belong
to any individual of the open dataset, we expect fewer minutes classified as
belonging to this class of the classifier in relation to the previous case; and (3)
for recordings that belong only to the open dataset, we expect the classifier to be
more ”confused” during classification of windows belonging to recordings of this
type. Thus, we would expect these windows to be more uniformly distributed
among the classes of the classifier in relation to case (1). Note that an important
requirement for this attack is that the recordings in the two datasets contain
data from the same sensor types.
Figure 5: The scenario we investigate with Apnea-ECG respiratory recordings.
”A” depicts the adversary, which learns the sensory representations from the
breach and generalizes on the open dataset. Her goal is to identify which indi-
viduals from the breach have participated in the open dataset. A non-adversarial
user ”U” utilizes the open dataset for apnea detection and generalizes on a test
set. As anonymized open dataset we either use the real raw data or AM stimuli.
17
5.1.2 Experiment
To simplify the experiment, we assume that unbeknownst to the adversary all
data from the open dataset belong to the breach. Figure 5 demonstrates the
experiment. We use Apnea-ECG, and utilize all four respiratory sensors for
this task, because we need as much information as possible to map patterns to
specific individuals. Apnea-ECG has eight respiratory recordings corresponding
to different individuals. We separate each individual original recording into three
equal parts, and create the ”breach recordings”, the ”open dataset recordings”
and the test set in which we evaluate the performance of the open dataset for
sleep apnea detection. From the open dataset and the final test set, we randomly
discard four recording parts (a02,a03,c02,b01).
The Adversary trains a neural network to be able to differentiate the data
from individuals, and attempts to find associations with the recordings in the
open dataset. Meanwhile, a User utilizes the open dataset to train a model
for the task of sleep apnea detection and generalizes on a test set. We explore
three cases: Case (1): the open dataset includes directly the raw data; Case
(2): the open dataset includes AM stimuli instead of the raw data; Case (3):
the open dataset includes selectively inhibitory AM stimuli based on the ex-
tension from Section 2.3 instead of raw data. For all models, we use a similar
small convolutional-fully connected architecture. For more details please refer
to Appendix B.
We need to evaluate two different properties in this experiment for the three
cases. First, we need to evaluate the success of the Adversary. This is not
trivial, and depends on what we mean by ”success”. In this work, for Case
(1), we evaluate by calculating the performance of the adversary in classifying
correctly individual minutes i.e., to which individual each minute belongs. We
use the kappa statistic as the evaluation metric. For Cases (2) and (3), we do
not have direct access to the classes of the stimuli. Thus, we need a different
method. We approximate the stimuli classes with hTU i.e., a classifier which be-
longs to the creator of the open dataset, that is trained to differentiate between
the recordings in the open dataset. Then we can calculate performance metrics
also for Cases (2) and (3) with hTU ’s beliefs as true labels. We use again the
kappa statistic. To gather more information, we show classification histograms
of the adversary for the three cases we investigate, and the maximum output
probability per class (average across all datapoints belonging to the specified
class). These graphs can be used by the attacker as tools to extrapolate record-
ing associations, so we show them for completion. Second, we need to evaluate
the success of the User on the original task, i.e., sleep apnea detection for each
of the three cases. To do this we calculate the performance of each of the 3
cases on the test set. Again we use the kappa statistic as the evaluation metric.
All experiments are repeated ten times.
The adversarial identification kappa is: 0.766, 0.251 and 0.004 for Cases
(1),(2), and (3) respectively. As expected for the last two cases the adversary
has on average less success in recognizing correctly the individuals from which
the datapoints indirectly occur than for Case (1). Figure 6 (a-c) depict the per-
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(a) Real Data (b) AM stimuli (c) AM inhibitory stimuli
(d) Real Data (e) AM stimuli (f) AM inhibitory stimuli
Figure 6: First Row: Per-class histograms of the adversary classification (blue)
and the true labels (orange) for the three cases. Second Row: Maximum out-
put probability per-class (averaged across the samples of the class). The four
first classes correspond to the individuals of the open dataset. In all cases the
depicted run corresponds to the run of median performance.
class percentage of classified datapoints of the adversary for the three cases. We
also include the true (or approximated by hTU ) class distribution (depicted as
orange). The open dataset recording classes are the first four classes, i.e., classes
0-3. For Case (1) the first four classes have much higher percentages. This is
not true for Cases (2) and (3), where the adversary is not able to successfully
generalize to the appropriate classes. A difference between Cases (2) and (3) is
that for Case (2) the percentages are much more concentrated than for Case (3),
which also holds for the approximated ”true labels”. This is expected due to the
inhibitory optimization with hTU , through which we explicitly avoid the repre-
sentations that hTU utilizes to distinguish between different recordings. Figure
6, (d-g) show the maximum output probabilities per-class. Again, for Cases
(2) and (3), we do not observe strong associations to the correct recordings.
However for Case (1) the classes of the open dataset are more strongly repre-
sented than the other classes.For Case (2) some outputs are missing, because
the adversarial predictions did not contain any data with maximum output of
this class. The kappa of the sleep apnea detection task on the test set is: 0.98,
0.903 and 0.968 for Cases (1),(2), and (3) respectively. Interestingly, Case (2)
performed on-average worse than Case (3) despite the additional constraints
imposed in the feature space for Case (3).
From the above analysis we observe that the proposed procedures, espe-
cially with the extension of Section 2.3 can successfully create an anonymized
dataset, with relatively minor sacrifices in performance. This makes it hard for
an adversary to make correct associations about specific individuals.
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5.2 Student Resilience Against Membership Inference At-
tacks
An additional side effect of the proposed approach is the resilience hS obtains
against certain information leakage attacks. This phenomenon occurs since
hS is trained with a substitute training dataset, whose marginal distribution
is different from that of the original data. In this section, we experimentally
evaluate the resilience of hS against membership inference (MI) attacks.
In MI attacks the adversary tries to determine whether a given datapoint
belongs to the training dataset, based on the output of hS . For a classifier hT
trained on the real training data, we expect a statistically different behavior on
its output when presented with data that were used to train it than when pre-
sented with data that were not used to train it. This difference can be exploited
by an adversary to learn whether a datapoint belongs to the training set or not.
However, since we use a very different dataset from the real training dataset
which also follows different distribution, we hypothesize that it is possible to
negate the effect of the MI attack for hS . We follow in this experiment the
approach from [32], but we simplify it. Instead of using shadow models trained
on synthetic data to imitate the performance of the target classifier (hS), we
assume that we have auxiliary information in the form of a-priori knowledge of
whether data belong to the training or test set of the target model. Thus, we
train a new classifier hmi on the ouput of hS to recognize whether a datapoint
belongs to the training set of hS or not. We evaluate the success of the attack
with the use of kappa statistic since this is a two class problem (belong to train
or to the test set), and we use the Apnea-ECG and A3 datasets for evaluation.
Additionally, we apply the attack to hT . Thus, we compare how successful the
attack is when applied to a classifier which has been trained directly with the
real data than when it is applied to hS i.e., a classifier trained with the AM
stimuli in place of the real data. We use the same ID architecture used for the
previous experiments, for hS and for hT . For hmi we used a small 4-layer fully
connected network with 30-50 neurons per layer and elu activations. We trained
hS and hT for Apnea-ECG and A3 for 100 and 10 epochs respectively. For both
datasets we did not use the whole dataset but a randomly drawn sample of
size 1000 for Apnea-ECG (500 training and 500 test) and 15000 for A3 (7500
training and 7500 test). In both cases we used 66.6% of the dataset to train
hmi and 33.3% to evaluate. The experiment was repeated five times.
The Apnea-ECG results, in terms of kappa are: hT : 0.120, hS : 0.044. For the
A3 study: hT : 0.231, hS : 0.042. These results correspond to the success of hmi
in identifying whether previously unseen data were or were not used to train the
model which is under attack (hT or hS depending on the experiment). Though
hS does not directly use the training data during its training, the training-test
separation is the same for hS and hT . From these results we observe that even
though the attack was for both datasets relatively unsuccessful both for hT and
hS , it was much more successful for hT than for hS , as expected.
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5.3 Class Recognition of Stimuli
An interesting observation regarding the proposed approach is that there seems
to be disagreement across different algorithms trained on the real data, for the
classes of the stimuli. This occurs even for the X → Y task, for which the stimuli
maximize hT ’s output. We experimented with a linear SVM, a DNN (relu),
a Random Forest (RF) ensemble with 50 trees, a Convolutional architecture
identical to hT and three humans. We trained the four algorithms on the real
data and evaluated them on a batch of 10000 from the MNIST stimuli dataset.
For the humans, we randomly extracted a smaller batch of 100 stimuli and they
performed digit classification on the batch. We used another 100 MNIST real
test datapoints as baseline. The results are shown in Table 3. The examined
methods and humans are not able to sufficiently identify the AM stimuli. As
before, we attribute this to the inductive bias mismatch between the methods
or humans and hT . This is also supported by the much better recognition for
the convolutional architecture identical to hT . Notice also the strong correlation
with Section 4.6. The models that had more difficulty to learn the patterns and
generalize successfully to the real data are the ones performing the worst also
in this experiment, as expected.
Stimuli Class Recognition MNIST (hT trained for 2344 batches, Acc%)
Method SVM RF DNN Humans Conv ID
Baseline 93.91 96.69 97.69 97.00 99.20
AM Batch 26.78 28.85 38.84 17.30 79.39
Table 3: Class recognition of the AM stimuli from different algorithms trained
on the real data and three humans. It is measured as accuracy over the stimuli
batch.
6 Discussion
In this section we analyze important observations which occurred throughout
our experiments.
6.1 Training Times
An interesting point of discussion is the required training time of the proposed
approach. AM is by definition efficient, since assuming that we can easily reach
the specified threshold, the AM generator only needs several steps to converge
and satisfy the predefined condition. The total time accumulates linearly with
the number of stimuli. In this work, we did not focus on training time, and
we experimented mainly with larger numbers of stimuli. However, we can still
obtain satisfactory performance even with a relatively small number of stimuli,
e.g., with 3000 stimuli we can achieve an accuracy of 92% on MNIST. We needed
close to 6 min to generate 3000 stimuli on a Nvidia-RTX 2000 Graphics Card.
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Based on this discussion the overall training time depends on how many stimuli
we need, which in turn depends on our performance requirements.
Additionally, the generalization capability of GAM can be leveraged to gener-
ate multiple stimuli after the AM generator has converged. However the stimuli
from each run are very similar. Thus, additional diversity regularization is re-
quired. We leave this option for future work.
6.2 Performance Per Stimulus
Figure 7: Accuracy of hT (orange) and
ID hS (blue) for 1000 stimuli, for differ-
ent number of training iterations of the
hT .
We observe that the performance
per stimulus is not the same among
hT trained for different numbers of
epochs. Figure 7 shows for MNIST
the performance of hT trained for
different numbers of epochs on the
orange line. The blue line depicts
how the hS with identical architec-
ture performs when trained with 1000
data stimuli generated from the re-
spective hT . We observe that when
hT is trained for a larger number of
batches, the performance of hS for
1000 stimuli significantly drops. The
best performance of hS in this ex-
periment is obtained only for 390-790
batches of training. However, for 390-
790 batches the performance of hT is
generally low, and so the maximum
reachable performance for hS is lower than for the hT that are trained for more
iterations. For this reason, we choose the hT trained for 3125 batches for our
MNIST experiments. This choice yields a good hT performance and not the
worst AM dataset performance for 1000 stimuli. We use similar criteria for the
training of hT for the apnea datasets.
7 Related Work
We first discuss related works which regard transferring knowledge between
different classifiers. Then we turn our focus on anonymization for generative
models. Finally, we analyze additional works that are useful and provide insights
towards our approach.
7.1 Knowledge Transfer
Recently, many new techniques for transferring knowledge have been proposed,
especially with the goal of reducing the size of a DNN to decrease the execution
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time and reduce memory consumption. Existing model compression techniques,
e.g., via pruning or parameter sharing [33, 34, 35, 36] can be considered as a
form of knowledge transfer from a trained teacher to a student. Other types
of methods perform knowledge transfer between different tasks and domains
[37, 38]. Furthermore, techniques exist that transfer knowledge from smaller
DNNs to equal sized or larger DNNs to make them learn faster [39] or to perform
better than the original network [40]. In the knowledge distillation method
[41], the student network is trained to match the classes of the original data
together with a modified version of the softmax output probabilities from the
trained teacher network. This allows to control the steepness of the output class
probability distribution. Romero et al. [42] introduce fitnets, an extension of
knowledge distillation to train thinner deeper networks (student) from wider
shallower ones (teacher). Bucilua et al. [43] investigate the compression of
large ensembles (like RF, bagged decision trees, etc.) via the use of a very small
artificial neural network (ANN). As a universal approximator, the ANN is able to
generalize to mimic the learned function of the ensemble. To train the ANN they
create a larger synthetic dataset based on the real dataset that is labeled by the
ensemble. Luo et al. [44] use knowledge distillation on a selection of informative
neurons of top hidden layers to train the student network. The selection is
done by minimizing an energy function that penalizes high correlation and low
discriminativeness. In [45], Papernot et al. use a similar student-teacher(s)
scenario in order to train a student in a differentially private manner. The
teacher ensemble is not released to the user, and also training of the student is
done with real data (that are not in the private dataset) and a GAN used in a
semi-supervised manner based on [27].
7.2 Generative Models and Anonymity
Regarding anonymization for generative models, many approaches exist which
incorporate the differential privacy framework into the GAN framework [9, 10,
46]. Contrary to these approaches, we focus on ”hiding” certain data features.
We achieve this by learning to avoid representations that leak these features,
based on the output of an approximator of the true conditional. Thus, the pro-
posed approach is data dependent and not a universal method incorporated in a
mechanism. Other approaches manipulate the GAN framework in order to gen-
erate anonymized data (mainly images) for medical or general purposes [47, 48].
Several approaches [49, 20] utilize data-centric anonymization strategies simi-
lar to ours in order to hide sensitive information from potential adversaries.
However, both of these aforementioned works modify or encode existing data-
points with the use of adversarial frameworks. In contrast, we generate stimuli
without directly accessing the real data. An interesting observation is that the
vast majority of recent works utilizes modifications of the GAN framework to
achieve their respective goals. The GAN framework is a natural choice in cases
where data realism is important. As we do not have such a requirement we are
interested in exploring an alternative approach.
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7.3 AM and Other Works
To better understand the internal representations of a DNN, the AM technique
is introduced in [13] for qualitative evaluation of higher-level internal represen-
tations of two unsupervised deep architectures. In [17], Nguyen et al. use a
deep generative network to synthesize images that maximize the output of a
neuron of a certain layer of the network. We base our approach on some of
these insights.
For the purpose of clarity, a distinction should be made between our ap-
proach and approaches which include the use of trained convolutional filters.
Convolutional filters are good feature extractors [50, 51] and these features can
be used to train models [52], or be transferred from the feature space of a given
domain to another domain [53]. However, we focus on training (from scratch) a
new student classifier so that it can generalize well to a sub-region of the feature
space defined from the AM (maximization or minimization). To do this, we take
advantage of the same inductive bias which occurs by the use of a similar stu-
dent architecture to that of the teacher. We do not use teacher layers as feature
extractors. We use synthetic data sampled from the marginal distribution after
AM is performed and not real data from another domain to train the student.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
The primary motivation for the proposed approach is to address the problem
of limited training data availability due to privacy and sharing regulations.
Our aim is to enable users to successfully train and customize models while
minimizing the risk of identification for individuals who have contributed in the
formation of the original dataset. As such, arbitrary users can benefit from
private medical data sets to train or develop their own classification models. To
achieve this we utilize AM in a generative manner, and create a multi-faceted
dataset of stimuli that captures implicitly the class separation of the real data.
In this work we emphasize on a medical setting, and apply the proposed
approach on the problem of sleep apnea detection. We utilize data from real-
world clinical studies, and showcase its viability for the task. Furthermore, we
evaluate on the task of digit recognition, and verify that the proposed approach
is generalizable to different tasks and domains. Training with synthetic stimuli
can yield promising results that are comparable or superior to a well-established
generative method which can successfully produce realistic data. In this paper,
we mainly evaluate on smaller classifiers potentially for use in a resource con-
strained environment. We experimentally show that we can utilize synthetic
stimuli in place of real data to anonymize individuals that have contributed to
the real dataset with their data. Furthermore, we utilize the proposed approach
to produce a classifier that is more resilient against specific information leakage
attacks, namely MI attacks.
In our ongoing and future work we address the customization of a student
classifier hS towards the personal and unlabeled data of the end-user. In other
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words, we aim to use NE for domain adaptation with only hT and the unlabeled
data of the end-user as input, and a personalized hS as output. For both of
these steps, we want to investigate the performance of NE if the classifier has
differentially private guarantees.
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Appendix A Accuracy, Specificity, Sensitivity for
Apnea Detection Experiments
Appendix A shows the Accuracy, Sensitivity, and Specificity for the Apnea
detection experiments for the different hS architectures for the Apnea-ECG
and A3 datasets.
hT Accuracy
Baseline WGAN AM
AE ID: 93.59±0.10 86.39±0.44 92.06±0.18
AE S: 93.81±0.24 85.04±0.42 91.36±0.29
AE VS: 92.91±0.13 86.39±0.47 90.92±0.20
AE L: 92.42±0.12 86.65±0.30 90.93±0.34
AE LL: 92.93±0.13 85.77±0.14 90.56±0.15
A3 ID: 83.67±0.09 80.37±0.15 81.72±0.33
A3 S: 83.79±0.10 80.03±0.27 81.69±0.28
A3 VS: 83.16±0.02 79.69±0.30 80.18±0.51
A3 L: 83.74±0.07 80.32±0.15 82.13±0.10
A3 LL: 83.42±0.05 79.72±0.28 81.19±0.13
Table 4: Accuracy of hS for AE and A3 experiments for different hS sizes when
training with data generated from our method and from a conditional WGAN
of similar size.
hT Specificity hT Sensitivity
Baseline WGAN AM Baseline WGAN AM
AE ID: 94.11±0.12 87.97±0.41 90.24±0.21 92.89±0.29 84.23±1.03 94.54±0.22
AE S: 93.34±0.27 87.52±0.23 89.36±0.36 94.45±0.60 81.64±1.02 94.10±0.69
AE VS: 92.71±0.26 84.99±0.55 88.85±0.30 93.32±0.35 88.30±1.82 93.76±0.29
AE L: 93.28±0.20 87.14±0.27 89.23±0.27 91.24±0.25 84.49±1.01 93.24±0.50
AE LL: 92.08±0.33 86.26±0.12 88.35±0.32 94.10±0.46 85.10±0.46 93.58±0.08
A3 ID: 80.72±0.43 76.57±0.71 75.81±1.05 86.18±0.32 83.62±0.63 86.76±0.38
A3 S: 80.39±1.05 75.67±1.33 76.13±01.03 86.69±0.39 83.75±0.95 86.44±0.48
A3 VS: 80.39±1.05 74.93±0.64 76.57±3.01 85.54±0.87 83.75±0.88 83.26±2.03
A3 L: 81.29±0.78 74.38±1.07 77.61±0.65 85.84±0.62 85.38±0.65 85.98±0.40
A3 LL: 81.31±0.81 73.95±1.26 79.23±1.27 85.22±0.67 84.65±0.78 82.86±1.01
Table 5: Specificity and Sensitivity of hS for AE and A3 experiments.
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Appendix B Architectures and Hyperparameters
for the Models Used
In Appendix B, we show the architectures and hyperparameter values for the
different models used in the experiments. We present the architectures of (1)
the trained networks containing knowledge for the data distribution (conditional
or joint, i.e., teachers T), (2) of the students that learn implicitly from the
teachers, and (3) of other networks that are used as intermediates (namely the
AM generator and the WGAN discriminator). Tables 3-8 showcase these results.
For Apnea-ECG, we use a batch size of 100. For A3 and MNIST, we use
batch size of 128. All of random noise input are sampled from a standard normal
distribution. The learning rate used for the Apnea-ECG and A3 experiments is
0.0001, and 0.001 for the MNIST experiments. We omit biases in all tables for
simplicity. In all cases they correspond to the size of the output for the layer
(number of channels on Convolutional or Transpose convolutional Layers).
B.1 Teachers T
We present the architectures of the models used as T for the different experi-
ments in Tables 6,7,8.
Architectures used
WGAN Generator Classifier hT (ID Arch.)
fc,D,relu: 31×60 fc,D,relu: 60×360
fc,D,relu: 60×180 fc,D,relu: 360×180
fc,tanh: 180×360 fc,relu: 180×64
fc,λ*tanh: 360×60 fc,softmax: 64×2
Table 6: Teacher Architectures used for the Apnea-ECG experiments (fc: Fully
connected, input×output. The activation function used is shown next to the
layer type separated with comma. If used, we show dropout as D).
Architectures used
WGAN Generator Classifier hT (ID Arch.)
fc,relu: (128+10)×1024 Conv,relu,MP: 1×32×5×5
fc,relu: 1024×2048 Conv,relu,MP: 32×28×5×5
ConvTr,relu: 128×3×3×32 fc,relu,D: (28×7×7)×1024
ConvTr,relu: 32×4×4×28 fc,softmax: 1024×10
ConvTr,sigmoid: 28×4×4×1 -
Table 7: Teacher Architectures used for the MNIST experiments
(Conv/ConvTransp: input channels×output channels×filter, MP: Max Pooling,
fc: Fully connected, input×output).
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Architectures used
WGAN Generator Classifier hT (ID Arch.)
fc,D,relu: (60+1)×120 Conv,relu,MP: 1×4×1×16
fc,D,relu: 120×1500 Conv,relu,MP: 16×4×1×32
ConvTr,relu: 100×4×1×16 Conv,relu,MP: 32×4×1×64
ConvTr,tanh: 16×4×1×32 fc,D,relu: (64×8)×64
ConvTr,tanh: 32×4×1×64 fc,D,relu: 64×32
ConvTr,tanh: 64×2×1×1 fc,softmax:32×2
Table 8: Teacher Architectures used for the A3 experiments (Conv/ConvTransp:
input channels×output channels×filter, MP: Max Pooling, fc: Fully connected,
input×output).
B.2 Students
We present the architectures of the models used as students for the different
experiments in Tables 9,10,11.
Student Architectures used Apnea-ECG
Classifier hS S Arch. V S Arch. L Arch. LL Arch.
fc,D,relu: 60×180 60×90 60×360 60×360
fc,D,relu: 180×90 90×45 360×180 -
fc,relu: 90×32 45×16 - -
fc,softmax: 32×2 16×2 180×2 360×2
Table 9: Student Architectures used for the Apnea-ECG experiments (fc: Fully
connected, input×output. The activation function used is shown next to the
layer type separated with comma. If used, we show dropout as D: Dropout).
Student Architectures used MNIST
Classifier hS S Arch. V S Arch. L Arch. LL Arch.
Conv,relu,MP: 1×16×5×5 1×16×5×5 1×32×5×5 1×32×5×5
Conv,relu,MP: 32×14×5×5 16×12×5×5 32×28×5×5 -
fc,relu,D: (14×7×7)×512 (12×7×7)×32 - -
fc,softmax: 512×10 32×10 (28×7×7)×10 (32×7×7)×10
Table 10: Student Architectures used for the MNIST experiments
(Conv/ConvTransp: input channels×output channels×filter, MP: Max Pooling,
fc: Fully connected, input×output).
B.3 Other Networks
In this section we describe the additional intermediate architectures used in our
experiments (i.e., WGAN Discriminators and the AM Generators).
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Student Architectures used
Classifier hS S Arch. V S Arch. L Arch. LL Arch.
Conv,relu,MP: 1×4×1×8 1×4×1×4 1×4×1×16 1×4×1×16
Conv,relu,MP: 8×4×1×16 4×4×1×8 16×4×1×32 16×4×1×32
Conv,relu,MP: 16×4×1×32 8×4×1×16 32×4×1×64 -
fc,D,relu: (32×8)×32 (16×8)×16 - -
(MP),fc,D,relu: 32×16 16×8 (64×8)×32 (32×8)×32
fc,softmax: 16×2 8×2 32×2 32×2
Table 11: Student Architectures used for the A3 experiments
(Conv/ConvTransp: input channels×output channels×filter, MP: Max
Pooling, fc: Fully connected, input×output).
B.3.1 AM Generator
We experimented with a variety of configurations as AM generator for the dif-
ferent experiments:
• Apnea-ECG: We use a 7-layer fully connected (512, 256, 256, 180, 60)
MLP with relu activations and dropout in the first two layers. The noise
input vector has size 512.
• MNIST: We use a convolutional-fully connected deconvolutional archi-
tecture, with 2 convolutional layers (1×32×5×5, 32×16×3 × 3), 1 fully
connected (7× 7× 16× 588), and 3 deconvolutional layers (12× 32× 2×
2,32×32×4×4, 32×1×4×4). All activations are relu except for the last
layer which is use sigmoid. the input noise vector has shape (28,28,1).
• A3: We use a fully connected-deconvolutional architecture with a 512
input noise vector, with 2 fully connected (MLP) layers (512,1000) and 5
deconvolutional layers (200×128×3×1, 128×128×4×1, 128×64]times4×1,
64× 16× 5× 1, 16× 1× 2× 1).
B.3.2 WGAN Discriminator
We experimented with a variety of configurations as AM generator for the dif-
ferent experiments:
• Apnea-ECG: We use a fully connected MLP with 4 fully connected lay-
ers, and an input of 61 (a 60 dimensional feature vector +1 a one dimen-
sional condition) (120, 180,30, 1), with relu activations and dropout in the
first 2 layers.
• MNIST: We use a convolutional network with an input of (28,28,1), 3
convolutional layers (1× 128× 5× 5, 128× 64× 5× 5, 64× 32× 5× 5) and
2 fully connected layers (128, 1). We use in all cases relu activations, and
dropout in the second to last fully connected layer. We pass the condition
in the first fully connected layer.
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• A3: We use a convolutional network with an input vector of 60, 3 con-
volutional layers (1 × 64 × 4 × 1, 64 × 32 × 4 × 1, 32 × 16 × 4 × 1), and
3 fully connected layers (120, 30, 1). We use in all cases relu activations,
and dropout in the 2 fully connected layers. We pass the condition in the
first fully connected layer.
B.3.3 Association through Generalization: Model
In this experiment we use the following architecture:
• We use a convolutional network and we normalize and concatenate the
4 features to create an input dimensionality of 240 (i.e., 4 × 60). We
use 3 convolutional layers (1 × 8 × 5 × 1, MaxPool1D, 8 × 16 × 5 × 1,
MaxPool1D, 16 × 32 × 3 × 1, MaxPool1D), and 3 fully connected layers
(30·32,480, Out). Out depends on the model. Out = 8 for the adversary.
Out = 4 for hTU . Out = 2 for the apnea detection classifier. We use in
all cases relu activations, and dropout in the 2 fully connected layers.
Appendix C Theoretical Analysis
In order to achieve good results with the proposed approach, we investigate
why and how the proposed method works. The main insights of this analytical
investigation are presented in this section.
C.1 General Insights
For our discussion, we first define the true risk R(h) of a hypothesis h as follows:
R(h) =
∫
X
∫
Y
L(h(x), y)p(x, y)dxdy = −
∫
X
∑
cj
p(y = cj |x)loghcj (x)p(x)dx
The equality holds when we are using cross-entropy as L, i.e., a tractable sur-
rogate of the 0-1 loss, and is straightforward to derive (see Appendix C.2). We
define the empirical risk RNemp as follows:
RNemp(h) = Ex,y∼pˆ(x,y)[L(h(x), y)] = −
1
N
N∑
i=1
K∑
c
yci logh
c(xi)
where hc is the output of class c, and yci is class c’s element of the one hot encoded
vector for input xi, yi = onehot(ci), and pˆ(x, y) the empirical joint distribution.
Assuming a classifier hT performs conditional density estimation and is trained
to minimize its loss (we assume cross-entropy) with the empirical distribution
corresponding to the samples and sample labels. Further, we assume that for
a given loss a generalization bound applies for the hypothesis space HT of hT .
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The bound decreases towards 0 as the sample size N increases to infinity. We
assume that with probability 1− δ, ∀hT ∈ HT :
R(hT ) ≤ RNemp(hT ) + C(N, δ) (3)
Based on Eq.(1) for h∗ = argminh∈HR(h), and hN = argminh∈HRNemp(h) as
N increases we have that: RNemp(h
∗) → R(h∗) (as for all other h ∈ H). As a
result, since C decreasing with N, we have one sided uniform convergence of the
empirical risk to the actual risk. Due to the key theorem of learning theory, this
means that the empirical risk minimization is consistent, i.e., the minimum of
empirical risk converges to the minimum of the true risk hN → h∗. Alternatively,
we can reach a similar conclusion, i.e., R(hN ) → R(h∗) via Theorem 1 and
Remark 4 from [?]. For this to hold we need to assume that the loss is bounded,
R and RNemp are L-Lipschitz with respect to the l2-norm, and that the hypothesis
space is parameterized with bounded parameter vector with respect to the l2-
norm. As we investigate in Appendix C.4 these constraints are met since they
are needed for the next step of our analysis. For hS , we want to minimize the
true risk:
R(hS) = −
∫
X
∑
c
p(y = c|x)loghcS(x)p(x)dx
= −
∫
X
∑
c
(hcT (x) + d
c(x))loghcS(x)p(x)dx
= −
∫
X
∑
c
(hcT (x))logh
c
S(x)p(x)dx−
∫
X
∑
c
(dc(x))loghcS(x)p(x)dx
= R1(hS) +R∆(hS)
(4)
From Eq. 4, we have access to hT , but not to d(x) (i.e., the difference between
the true p(y|X) and its estimate using hT ) and to p(x). We also do not use the
real data (sampled from p(x,y)). Thus, we focus on minimizing R1, assuming
that hT has generalized well. This would imply that d is more likely to be small
in X and thus that R∆ is more likely to be small.
However, we cannot minimize directly the first term since we do not have
access to p(x), or a sample of p(x). The cross-entropy loss is minimized when
the input distributions are equal, so if hS has the same architecture as hT ,
the first term is minimized (trivially) for hS = hT , i.e., by simply copying the
parameters of hT to hS .
When hS does not have the same architecture as hT , we use another proba-
bility distribution pZ(x) instead of p(x). pZ(x) should have the same support as
p(x), or a support which has a non-empty set intersection with the support of
p(x), depending on the domain we are interested in. Thus, we try to minimize
a ”distorted” version of the true risk, that is ”distorted ” in the sense that p(x)
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is replaced by pZ(x) and p(y|x)) is replaced by hT :
RZ(hS) = −
∫
X
∑
c
(hcT (x))log(h
c
S(x))pZ(x)dx
However again this minimization cannot be done analytically. Therefore, for
hS , we create a dataset by drawing arbitrarily many samples from pZ and
hT and training hS to minimize the resulting empirical risk R
NZ
Zemp
(hS) =
Ey∼hT ,x∼pZ [−yz · loghS(x)].
Here, we assume we generate probabilistically the labels yzi from hT in a one-
hot form. It is also possible to optimize directly for hT as function. If Eq. (1)
holds for HS (hypothesis space of hS), then the minimum of R
NZ
Zemp
(hS) , h
NZ
S =
argminhS∈HSR
NZ
Zemp
(hS) converges to the minimum h
∗
SZ
= argminhS∈HSRZ(hS)
(hNZS → h∗SZ as NZ →∞). However, if the hypothesis space HS cannot express
hT perfectly on X such that after the minimization ∀x ∈ X, hS(x) = hT (x) , it
is not necessarily the case that h∗SZ = h
∗
S1, where h
∗
S1 = argminhS∈HSR1(hS).
This is an inherent problem of the proposed method. However, if we make
some additional realistic assumptions about R1 and RZ , we can show that as
we increase the parameter space of the student ΘS to that of the teacher ΘT ,
assuming ΘS ⊂ ΘT , the upper bound of the expectation of R1 across the differ-
ent optimized teacher parameters decreases when we optimize RZ . This means
that as we increase ΘS and thus HS we can expect better R1 minimization by
minimizing RZ on a worst case. The interested reader can refer to Appendix
C.4 for details.
In summary, based on the above discussion, assuming a good bound, mini-
mizing RNZZemp minimizes RZ . This in turn minimizes R1 assuming the parameter
space of the student is large enough that we have a good R1 expectation. Fi-
nally, if R∆ is small ∀hS ∈ HS , minimizing R1 minimizes R, which is our goal.
In our case, we use AM to generate data for which our conditional distribution
approximator hT is confident about. As a result, during learning hS focuses on
these sub-regions of X. Depending on the confidence level that we choose, and
on hT and its training, these regions could contain important information which
could be generalized for the classification of the real data.
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C.2 Risk for Cross-Entropy
Since we have multi-label classification, and we use cross-entropy as loss, we
have:
R(h) =
∫
X
∫
Y
L(h(x), y)p(x, y)dxdy =
∫
X
∑
cj
L(h(x), yj)p(y = cj |x)p(x)dx
= −
∫
X
∑
cj
(
∑
ci
ycij logh
ci(x))p(y = cj |x)p(x)dx
= −
∫
X
∑
cj
p(y = cj |x)loghcj (x)p(x)dx
(5)
where yj is the one-hot encoding vector of the class.
C.3 Proposition
Proposition 1 For f(x), g(x): X → RN , where X is a compact set and f
and g belonging in a family of continuous, bounded functions G, and loss L,
also continuous with Lmin ≤ L ≤ Lmax, and Lmin > 0 in X, we assume
∀x ∈ X, and a given f, ming∈GL(f, g)(x) ⇐⇒ g(x) = f(x). Also, we assume
prior distributions P = {p1, p2...pM}, with support in X. Then all expectations
Ex∼pi [L(f, g)], i = 1...M , are minimized iff ∀x ∈ X, f(x) = g(x).
Proof: First we show that if all expectations Ex∼pi [L(f, g)], i = 1...M are min-
imized then, ∀x ∈ X, f(x) = g(x). We use proof-by-contradiction, i.e., we first
formulate the opposite statement, then show that it leads to a contradiction. In
the following we assume that L,f and g are continuous and bounded in X, and
X compact.
Statement: Given f∈ G ∃g ∈ G,and ∃pi ∈ P s.t ∀g2 ∈ G, Ex∼pi [L(f, g)] ≤
Ex∼pi [L(f, g2)], and ∃x ∈ X s.t f(x) 6= g(x). We know that ∀x ∈ X,L(f(x), f(x)) ≤
L(f(x), g(x)) by definition. This means that ∀pi ∈ P,Ex∼pi [L(f, f)] < Ex∼pi [L(f, g)].
This contradicts the above statement implying that ∀g2 ∈ G,Ex∼pi [L(f, g)] ≤
Ex∼pi [L(f, g2)],for f(x) 6= g(x) and some pi ∈ P .
Then we show that if ∀x ∈ X, f(x) = g(x), then all expectations of pi ∈ P
are minimized. If ∀x ∈ X, f(x) = g(x), then ∀g2 ∈ G,for which ∃x ∈ X s.t.
g2(x) 6= f(x) we have by definition that ∀x ∈ X L(f, f)(x) ≤ L(f, g2)(x). As a
result, Ex∼pi [L(f, f)] < Ex∼pi [L(f, g2)], i = 1...M .
C.4 Decreasing Bound on R1 when minimizing RZ
We perform the analysis for the decreasing bound for the expectation of R1 in
this Section. Before that we discuss preliminary notations and assumptions.
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C.4.1 Preliminaries, Notations and Assumptions
Notational Conventions:
• θ: Parameter vector for classifier h. θS , θT , correspond to parameter vec-
tors for the student and the teacher classifier respectively. When θ is used
this means a θ ∈ ΘT , regardless of student or teacher (i.e., the expression
applies for both, since ΘS ⊆ ΘT . See below).
• θ∗: Parameter vector after optimization has been performed. θ∗T , corre-
sponds to the optimization for the teacher, after the optimization of Remp.
θ∗SZ corresponds to the optimized parameters for the student, after opti-
mization for RZ has been performed. Dimensionality for the parameter
vector (i.e., how many parameters we have): |θT | = d.
• Θ: The parameter space of classifier h(see below). We use ΘT for the
parameter space of the teacher and ΘS for the parameter space of the
student. For our analysis (student has the same architecture with less
weights per layer than the teacher) ΘS ⊆ ΘT . For ΘS , we increase this
space, using a specific procedure, so that we transition from smaller net-
works (or in fact, networks which are identical to the teacher but contain
many deactivated neurons) to larger networks (with less deactivated neu-
rons). Thus, to showcase this increasing procedure we add the index n on
ΘnS , and for n1 < n2, we have that Θ
n1
S ⊆ Θn2S .
• h: The classifier architecture used. hT refers to the teacher classifier, using
θT and hS refers to the student classifier, using θS . When only h is used
without index, we imply that the expression holds for both classifiers hT
or hS is used. Also, we define as h
∗ the optimized h(θ∗, x).
• H: The hypothesis space for classifier h.
• L(hT , hS)(x) = L(hT (θT , x), hS(θS , x)): The loss between two functions
in x. We assume cross-entropy loss for our analysis. As such for a given
x ∈ X L(hS , hT )(x) = −
∑
c h
c
T (θT , x)log(h
c
S(θS , x)).
• Lmx(θ∗T ): Maximum loss with respect to θ∗T .
• Lmax: Maximum loss overall (for all θ∗T ).
• Bmx: Maximum allowed weight value for the teacher ( ΘT bounded).
• BSi : Maximum allowed weight for the student for weight i (i ∈ {0, d}).
Note: Always BSi ∈ [0, Bmx]. One by one each BSi increases in value as
we increase the parameter space of the student.
• R1(θT , θS) = −
∫
X
∑
c h
c
T (θT , x)log(h
c
S(θS , x))pD(x)dx.
• RZ(θT , θS) = −
∫
X
∑
c h
c
T (θT , x)log(h
c
S(θS , x))pZ(x)dx.
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• pD(x), pZ(x), pθ∗T (θ∗T ): Prior distributions. pD(x) corresponds to the real
data marginal distribution, pZ(x) to the synthetic distribution that we use,
and pθ∗T (θ
∗
T ) to the teacher parameter distribution after the optimization
of the teacher. Note that for this discussion, we assume that the support
of pθ∗T (θ
∗
T ),supp(pθ∗T (θ
∗
T )) = ΘT .
• r: Radius.
• B(., r): For our analysis, l∞-hyper-ball with radius r (so basically a mul-
tidimensional cube).
Regarding our assumptions, we firstly assume that all risks are continuously
differentiable functions (and as a result L-Lipschitz), that the parameter space
is bounded (in our analysis we bound the weights by the l∞-norm, and as a
result the parameter space is also bounded by the encompassing l2-norm), and
that the loss L is bounded (in X given ΘT , ΘS and the architectures of hT
and hS). Furthermore, we assume that both R1, RZ are functions with a finite
number of critical points or a finite number of regions of non-isolated critical
points, and that for all activations φ, φ(0) = 0 (with the exception of the output
where we assume softmax). Additionally, we assume that X is compact.
C.4.2 Main Discussion
Our goal in this discussion is therefore to show that, we can bound the ex-
pectation of R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
SZ
) assuming random variable θ∗T , and that this bound is
decreasing as we increase the parameter space of hS , ΘS (with ΘS ⊆ ΘT ). For
this to hold we need to bound the loss L (cross-entropy in our case), and thus we
assume bounds on every element of the vector θT ,−Bmx < θTi < Bmx, i ∈ {0, d}
where d is the total number of parameters of hT , |θT | = d. This together with
the compactness of X, and the continuity of the activations of hT means that
L(hT (θ
∗
T , x), h(θ, x)) ≤ Lmx(θ∗T ) = maxx∈X,θ∈ΘTL(hT (θ∗T , x), h(θ, x)). This
holds since we assume softmax activations at the output of h, hT . Further,
we define Lmax = maxθ∗T∈ΘT {Lmx(θ∗T )}.
Now we focus on the construction of ΘS and HS . Architecturally, we assume
that hS is identical to hT . We assume that for any given parameter vector
θS ∈ ΘS , |θS | = d, i.e., it has same dimensionality as θT . However, we assume
for the elements of θS that: −BSi < θSi < BSi , BSi ∈ [0, Bmx], i ∈ {0, d}. So we
allow connections to be deactivated (i.e., 0). If all input connections (including
the bias) of a neuron are deactivated then a neuron is also deactivated (since for
all activations φ ∈ hT , hS we have φ(0) = 0). Thus, we can create any student
whose architecture is thinner than the teacher. We cannot create students of
smaller depth with this procedure since if all neurons on a certain depth are
deactivated then regardless of input we will have a constant output (all classes
equal ∀x ∈ X since we use softmax output). Based on the above, we can
construct a set {ΘnS |n ∈ R}, such that ∀na, nbs.t, na < nb,ΘnaS ⊆ ΘnbS . We do
this by starting with all weight bounds BSi = 0, i ∈ {0, d} , and then picking
a random connection i, increasing BSi from 0 to Bmx, then choosing a new
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connection and repeating the process until ΘnS reaches ΘT . We use as index n
the total amount of ”freed up” weight on hS (for example if we are on our third
freed up connection and BS3 = q, then n = 2Bmx + q)
By definition we know:
∀x ∈ X,L(hT (θ∗T , x), h(θ, x)) = minhL(h∗T , h)(x) ⇐⇒ h∗T (x) = h(x) (6)
Note that θ∗T may not be unique. For a ΘS s.t θ
∗
T does not exist in ΘS ,
but ∃θ∗SZ = argminθ∈ΘSRZ(θ∗T , θ) s.t hS(θ∗SZ , x) = hT (θ∗T , x)∀x ∈ X, R1 is also
minimized for this θ∗SZ . This will not however affect our worst case discussion
of the expectation of R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
SZ
)here.
θ∗T follows a distribution with density pθ∗T (θ
∗
T ) (potentially imposed from the
initial weight distribution of hT together with potential inherent randomness
during the optimization of hT ), and we assume that our minimization will always
find the θ∗SZ which minimizes RZ in Θ
n
S . Then, θ
∗
SZ
is a function of θ∗T such
that:
θ∗SZ (θ
∗
T ) =
{
θ∗T , θ
∗
T ∈ ΘnS
θ∗n(θ
∗
T ), θ
∗
T 6∈ ΘnS
(7)
with R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
T ) ≤ R1(θ∗T , θ∗SZ (θ∗T )) =
∫
X
L(hT (θ
∗
T , x), hS(θ
∗
SZ
(θ∗T ), x))pD(x)dx
due to the minimization of the loss. We continue assuming for simplicity that θ∗T
which creates the particular h∗T is unique
6. ForR∗1MAX = maxθ∗T∈ΘT {R1(θ∗T , θ∗T )},
and R1MAX the maximum value for R1, we have that R
∗
1MAX < R1MAX (see sec-
tion C.4). We also know that ∀θ∗T 6∈ ΘnS , R1(θ∗T , θ∗n(θ∗T )) ≤ R1MAX . Based on
this we have:
Eθ∗T∼pθ∗T [R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
SZ (θ
∗
T ))] =
∫
ΘT
R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
SZ (θ
∗
T ))dP (θ
∗
T )
=
∫
ΘnS
R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
T )dP (θ
∗
T ) +
∫
¬ΘnS∩ΘT
R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
n(θ
∗
T ))dP (θ
∗
T )
≤
∫
ΘnS
R∗1MAXdP (θ
∗
T ) +
∫
¬ΘnS∩ΘT
R1MAXdP (θ
∗
T )
≤ R∗1MAX
∫
ΘnS
dP (θ∗T ) +R1MAX
∫
¬ΘnS∩ΘT
dP (θ∗T )
= R∗1MAXP (θ
∗
T ∈ ΘnS) +R1MAXP (θ∗T 6∈ ΘnS)
(8)
As we increase ΘnS , and we know that R
∗
1MAX < R1MAX the bound is de-
creasing, since more probability mass is put on the smaller R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
T ) and less
in the larger R1MAX . However, this form is naive for 2 reasons: (1) It does
6If multiple θ∗B ∈ ΘnS exist for which ∀x ∈ X,hS(θ∗B , x) = hT (θ∗T , x), then Eq. 8 or Eq.10
would change so that for the θ∗B ∪ θ∗T ∈ ΘnS , θ∗SZ takes the value of one of θ∗B included in ΘnS
it minimizes RZ(θ
∗
T , θ)∀θ ∈ ΘnS . This means that we would get a tighter bound since the set
A = {θ∗T |ΘB(θ∗T ) 6= ∅} ⊆ ¬ΘnS , where ΘB(θ∗T ) the subset of ΘT of all θ∗B .Then ∀θ∗T ∈ A we
can use the bound R1(θ∗T , θ
∗
T ) ≤ R∗1MAX instead of the R1MAX .
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not decrease until we reach the last edge, and we have formed the full teacher
network with the construction of ΘS . This is because when we add additional
edges, we will not have any increase in the density pθ∗T which is inside Θ
n
S until
we reach the final edge, since the increases for all previous edges are of lower
dimensionality. (2) We have not utilized any property of the minimization of
RZ .
In order to investigate how the expectation changes as we increase ΘnS on
a more useful setting that has actual utility, we make some additional observa-
tions.
For simplicity and since this is a worst case, continuing with the assump-
tion that only the true optimized parameters of hT , i.e., θ
∗
T yields the function
h∗T (x) = hT (θ
∗
T , x)∀x ∈ X, in all of ΘT .
We then, define df1 = minθ∗T∈ΘT {maxθ∈ΘT {R1(θ∗T , θ)} − R1(θ∗T , θ∗T )} > 0.
We know that df1 > 0 from the analysis of Section C.4. Then, a fundamental
observation for our analysis is that, due to continuity of R1 and RZ , and since θ
∗
T
is the strict global minimum in both R1 and RZ : ∀θ∗T ∈ ΘT ,∀δ1 > 0, we know
that ∃B(θ∗T , r1(θ∗T )), s.t. ∀θ′ ∈ B ∩ΘT , R1(θ∗T , θ′) ≤ R1(θ∗T , θ∗T ) + δ1. Similarly
for RZ and δz. Regarding the cases for which θ
∗
T resides in the boundaries of
ΘT , we use that part of the sphere that is inside ΘT .
Now we will use this property to construct a region close to θ∗T so that, based
on our assumptions if ΘnS has θS sub-regions inside it, then the R1 value of the
student which is RZ optimized, is guaranteed to be small (i.e., smaller than R1
plus an arbitrarily small δ1). We follow the following procedure:
• We choose δ1 ∈ (0, df1).
• For a θ∗T ∈ ΘT , we choose the maximum radius r1(θ∗T ) satisfying the above
property for δ1, r1MAX(θ
∗
T ) = maxr{r|∀θ′ ∈ B(θ∗T , r) ∩ ΘT , R1(θ∗T , θ′) ≤
R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
T ) + δ1}. Since in our analysis we want to use a single radius
for which we want the property to apply ∀θ∗T ∈ ΘT , we choose r1 =
minθ∗T {r1MAX(θ∗T )}.
• Then we transfer our analysis toRZ . For a θ∗T ∈ ΘT , we defineRZOUTMIN (θ∗T ) =
minθ∈ΘT {RZ(θ∗T , θ)|θ /∈ B(θ∗T , r1)}. We know that ∀θ∗T ∈ ΘT , RZOUTMIN (θ∗T ) >
RZ(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
T ) since RZ(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
T ) is strict global minimum. Based on this we
define dfZ = minθ∗T {RZOUTMIN (θ∗T )−RZ(θ∗T , θ∗T )} > 0.
• We define δZ ∈ (0, dfZ). Using the same arguments that we used to create
r1, we construct rZ .
• Then, because of the definition of δZ , rZ , we have that ∀θ∗T , if ∃θ′ ∈ ΘnS ,
s.t. θ′ ∈ B(θ∗T , rZ), θ∗SZ = argminθ∈ΘnS{RZ(θ∗T , θ)}, is inside B(θ∗T , r1).
This means that:
R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
SZ ) ≤ R1(θ∗T , θ∗T ) + δ1 ≤ R∗1MAX + δ1
< R∗1MAX + df1 ≤ R1MAX
41
Based on the above, as we increase our hypothesis space, we are search-
ing for a hyper-ball with radius rZ and dimensionality equal to the number of
parameters θ∗T instead of a single point
7.
Figure 8: Visualizations. The first row shows for a small network, the ”shell”
network h, and the active regions that define the Teacher (blue) and the student
(green). In the second row, we show the different cases in which ΘnS , hits
or misses the inner ball B(θ∗T , rZ). If Θ
n
S hits the inner ball, then the θ
∗
SZ
produced after the optimization of RZ will be inside B(θ
∗
T , r1) (outer ball),
thus guaranteeing that R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
SZ
) is small. In the third row we show the
equivalent problem when using the extended ΘnSE . Note that in all cases our
spaces (Balls or parameter spaces) are hypercubes (or unions of hypercubes).
In this illustration we show most of the spaces as circles for simplicity.
We observe that for a given ΘnS with dimensionality smaller than that of
ΘT (i.e., some weights do not contribute), if any point of a B(θ
∗
T , rZ), falls
within ΘnS , is equivalent with θ
∗
T falling within an extended set Θ
n
SE ⊃ ΘnS
with ΘnSE = {B(θ, rZ)|θ ∈ ΘnS}. However, based on the above discussion, when
θ∗T ∈ ΘnSE , we have that the minimization of RZ(θ∗T , θ), θ ∈ ΘnS , will find a good
θ˜T close to θ
∗
T , which is also good for minimizing R1, and depending on the
chosen δ1. Based on this, we use the following conventions for the 2 cases of
7Note here that if we do not assume uniqueness of minimization for R1, RZ , then if we have
a finite number of point minimizers we can use similar arguments with the main discussion
(use a union of balls close to the minimizers instead of a single ball).
If we have formations of minimizers, then in the case where we have only formations of the
same dimensionality as the teacher (i.e., if we have plateaus) then by increasing the dimen-
sionality of the student we increase the probability that ΘnS ”hits” the minimizer structure
without using hyperspheres. If we have lower dimensionality formations FB then for any of
these we create the hyperspheres for any given point θ∗B in the same way as in the main
discussion, but with the additional exclusion of other points of the formation from the condi-
tion (where we have equal values for R1, RZ), defining similar properties for the spheres, and
taking the union of the space which they create. In all these cases we obtain tighter bound.
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θ∗SZ :
θ∗SZ (θ
∗
T ) =
{
θ˜T (θ
∗
T ), θ
∗
T ∈ ΘnSE
θ∗n(θ
∗
T ), θ
∗
T 6∈ ΘnSE
(9)
We know that, ∀θ1, θ2 ∈ ΘT , R1(θ1, θ2) ≤ R1MAX . Additionally, based on
section C.4, and the above discussion we have that R∗1MAX +δ1 < R1MAX . Then:
Eθ∗T∼pθ∗T [R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
SZ (θ
∗
T ))] =
∫
ΘT
R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
SZ (θ
∗
T ))dP (θ
∗
T )
=
∫
ΘnSE
R1(θ
∗
T , θ˜T (θ
∗
T ))dP (θ
∗
T ) +
∫
¬ΘnSE∩ΘT
R1(θ
∗
T , θ
∗
n(θ
∗
T ))dP (θ
∗
T )
≤
∫
ΘnSE
(R∗1MAX + δ1)dP (θ
∗
T ) +
∫
¬ΘnSE∩ΘT
R1MAXdP (θ
∗
T )
≤ (R∗1MAX + δ1)
∫
ΘnSE
dP (θ∗T ) +R1MAX
∫
¬ΘnSE∩ΘT
dP (θ∗T )
= (R∗1MAX + δ1)P (θ
∗
T ∈ ΘnSE) +R1MAXP (θ∗T 6∈ ΘnSE)
(10)
The most important difference from the previous bound is, that for this bound,
the extended student space has the same dimensionality as the teacher, although
the actual student has a smaller dimensionality (less active weights). This means
that as we increase ΘnS , even when it has a smaller dimensionality than ΘT , the
probability that the student finds a good parameterization for R1 by minimizing
RZ actually increases, because the probability that θ
∗
T ∈ ΘnSE increases, and
thus the expectation of R1 decreases. This means that this bound is actually
usable as a worst case scenario for a smaller than the teacher student, and it
shows that as we increase the dimensionality of the student, the expected risk
decreases even though we use a different prior pZ . Additionally, for a large choice
of δ1, the drop of expectation as we increase Θ
n
SE becomes small. However,
for large δ1, rz is generally expected to be larger, and thus the decrease in the
bound more efficient than for a small choice of δ1 (i.e., we can reach the minimum
expectation for a smaller ΘnSE than if we chose a small δ1). Finally, if we assume
there exist multiple θB(θ
∗
T ), for which hT (θ
∗
T , x) = hT (θB(θ
∗
T ), x),∀x ∈ X, we
follow a similar procedure as before (see footnotes 1,2) and end up with a tighter
bound. In Figure 8 we include a visualization of the different spaces.
C.5 Why R1MAX > R
∗
1MAX
We show the statement of the title in the following points:
(1) We assume that,∀θ1 ∈ ΘT , ∃θ2 ∈ ΘT , s.t, ∃x ∈ X with h(θ1, x) 6= h(θ2, x)
(i.e., we have at least 2 different functions in HT ).
(2) Since all functions in HT are continuous, and given all the requirements
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we have fulfilled (X,ΘT compact, L continuous and bounded h continuous and
bounded etc), we derive from (1) (given Proposition 1): ∀θ1 ∈ ΘT maxθ∈ΘT {R1(θ1, θ)} >
R1(θ1, θ1).
(3) We define R∗1MAX = maxθ1∈ΘT {R1(θ1, θ1)}. We know it exists because of
all the compact and bounded constraints. Given (2) we know that for θ1MAX =
argmaxθ1∈ΘT {R1(θ1, θ1)}, maxθ∈ΘT {R1(θ1MAX , θ)} > R1(θ1MAX , θ1MAX ) = R∗1MAX
(4) We defineR1MAX = maxθ1∈ΘT {maxθ∈ΘT {R1(θ1, θ)}} ≥ maxθ∈ΘT {R1(θ1MAX , θ)} >
R∗1MAX from (3).
Appendix D Adding Randomness
In order to create a multi-faceted stimuli dataset, we would ideally need the
AM distribution (pAM ) to have a uniform support in the regions which we have
defined as important, based on our threshold of acceptance.
Figure 9: Editor Design. Instead of generating datapoints to perform AM, we
edit randomly sampled data.
To achieve this we want (1) to capture a wide variety of initial positions from
the feature space, and then perform AM (so ideally we would want supp(pAMin) =
supp(p)) and (2) add variability to the AM process itself. To achieve these points
we perform the following during the execution of our algorithm:
• Reinitializations: We use our AM Generator to perform AM towards
one class, we save the stimuli after it successfully surpassed the threshold
of acceptance, and then we choose randomly another class to perform AM.
Sporadically, we reinitialize the AM Generator, as the process can lead to
numerical instability without reinitializations.
• Random Thresholds: In order to capture homogeneously the regions
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that are above a certain acceptance threshold (Tmin) for the class proba-
bilities of hT , we use a randomly changing threshold with T ∈ [Tmin, 1].
• Use of larger initial weights in the AM Generator: As we use reinitial-
izations, we want to capture a large region of the feature space from the
initial positions. For this reason when we use the AM Generator, we use
larger than usual standard deviations in the weight initializations. How-
ever, this can lead to numerical instability during the AM Maximization.
To solve this problem, we propose a more elegant solution described in
the next point.
• Use of AM Editor instead of AM Generator: Instead of generating
a synthetic stimulus (Generator), we sample randomly a datapoint from a
uniform distribution with support in the feature space. Based on a scaled
tanh function we use a network to perform edits to this datapoint until we
satisfy our threshold target. This way, we have supp(pAMin) = X, which
is very close to what we want in point (1). In order for the generated
samples to be within the bounds of X, we include a rescale operator
before feeding the stimuli to hT . We experimented with this design in the
MNIST experiments. The results surpassed the results when using an AM
Generator with the same architecture, for the same number of stimuli. In
Figure 9, we show the proposed design.
Appendix E Closest Neighbors per Dataset
In this Appendix, we present the closest neighbors (l2-norm) between the
real and AM datasets (Figures 10,11).
Figure 10: Closest neighbors between the Real(Left) and AM stimuli (Right)
datasets for MNIST
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Figure 11: Closest neighbors between the Real (Left) and AM stimuli (Right)
datasets for Apnea-ECG (first row) and A3 (second row)(mV). Since A3 is a
real-world dataset, with minimal pre-processing, we have many ”inactive” dat-
apoints that correspond to cases with sensor misplacement, bad sensor quality
etc. In this case, the closest neighbor from the A3 study corresponds to such a
datapoint.
46
